THE 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT 28 PAGES RELEASED THE 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT 28 PAGES RELEASED Publishing the long-awaited pages 13 years after they were first classified, the White House insisted they show no link between Saudi Arabia and the hijackers who carried out the terrorist attacks. The pages put into the public domain the remaining unseen section of the 2002 report, from the joint congressional inquiry into intelligence community activities before and after the 9/11 attacks. “This information does not change the assessment of the US government that there’s no evidence that the Saudi government or senior Saudi individuals funded al-Qaida,” said Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary. “The number one takeaway from this should be that this administration is committed to transparency even when it comes to sensitive information related to national security.” The publication, awaited for 13 years, will not necessarily end speculation around Saudi influence, however. The 28 pages show that, according to FBI documents, several numbers found in the phone book of Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qaida operative captured in Pakistan in March 2002 who is still being detained at Guantánamo Bay, could be linked, at least indirectly, to phone numbers in the US. Among them was a number “subscribed to” by a company in Aspen, Colorado, that managed the residence of the then Saudi ambassador, Bandar bin Sultan. In addition, according to an FBI document, the phone number of a bodyguard at the Saudi embassy in Washington, “who some have alleged may be a” – several words have been redacted – “was also found in Abu Zubaida’s (sic) possession”. Zubaydah became the test case for the CIA’s post-9/11 torture program. Waterboarded more than 83 times in one month at a CIA black site in Thailand, Zubaydah was ultimately determined by CIA interrogators not to have yielded reliable intelligence from his abuse. A recently declassified document from CIA medical personnel judged that he “probably reached the point of cooperation” before his torture, even though CIA interrogators, according to the Senate’s 2014 investigation, convinced themselves Zubaydah had actionable and specific intelligence on imminent al-Qaida plots. Since 2006, Zubaydah has resided in a classified section of the Guantánamo Bay wartime prison complex. The US has never charged him with any offense; a 2009 justice department filing contesting his habeas corpus petition walked back the government’s frequent claim that Zubaydah was a senior member of al-Qaida, calling him merely an “affiliate”. The newly declassified section of the congressional inquiry does not draw conclusions about Bandar, let alone accusations of complicity in 9/11, despite listing known or suspected associations to people once believed to have aided the terrorist attack. At several points its source material, largely derived from the FBI, states that it has closed inquiries or held them in “abeyance”, as with the Aspcol connection. Yet some of the sections of the declassified pages remain withheld. One such section concerns a Saudi navy officer who in March 2000 was in telephonic contact with two of the hijackers. It is unclear if the FBI ultimately found anything relevant on the officer, but the FBI currently does not consider the Saudi Arabian government complicit in the attack. Former president George W Bush had classified the chapter, part of a bigger 2002 congressional investigation into the 9/11 attacks, to protect intelligence sources and methods and, many believe, to avoid offending Saudi Arabia, an oil-rich US ally. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission), an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation and the signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002, is chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks. The Commission is also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks. The Commission has released its final report, available below in PDF format. The report is also available in bookstores nationwide and from theGovernment Printing Office. Frequently Asked Questions about the report are answered on this site. 9-11 Commission Report Public Statement by the Chair and Vice Chair Regarding the Report PDF, 36 KB Executive Summary PDF, 372 KB HTML, 64 KB Complete 9/11 Commission Report PDF, 7.4 MB Report by Section Contents, List of Illustrations and Tables, Members, and Staff PDF, 372 KB HTML, 64 KB Preface PDF, 67 KB HTML, 14 KB 1. "We Have Some Planes" 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 1.3 National Crisis Management PDF, 952 KB HTML, 133 KB 2. The Foundation of the New Terrorism 2.1 A Declaration of War 2.2 Bin Ladin's Appeal in the Islamic World 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988-1992) 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992-1996) 2.5 Al Qaeda's Renewal in Afghanistan (1996-1998) PDF, 1.4 MB HTML, 72 KB 3. Counterterrorism Evolves 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 3.2 Adaptation--and Nonadaptation--in the Law Enforcement Community 3.3 ... and in the Federal Aviation Administration 3.4 ... and in the Intelligence Community 3.5 ... and in the State Department and the Defense Department 3.6 ... and in the White House 3.7 ... and in the Congress PDF, 188 KB HTML, 116 KB 4. Responses to Al Qaeda's Initial Assaults 4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 4.2 Crisis: August 1998 4.3 Diplomacy 4.4 Covert Action 4.5 Searching for Fresh Options PDF, 185 KB HTML, 113 KB 5. Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland 5.1 Terrorist Entrepreneurs 5.2 The "Planes Operation" 5.3 The Hamburg Contingent 5.4 A Money Trail? PDF, 312 KB HTML, 89 KB 6. From Threat To Threat 6.1 The Millennium Crisis 6.2 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 6.3 The Attack on the USS Cole 6.4 Change and Continuity 6.5 The New Administration's Approach PDF, 209 KB HTML, 129 KB 7. The Attack Looms 7.1 First Arrivals in California 7.2 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States 7.3 Assembling the Teams 7.4 Final Strategies and Tactics PDF, 949 KB HTML, 119 KB 8. "The System Was Blinking Red" 8.1 The Summer of Threat 8.2 Late Leads--Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM PDF, 146 KB HTML, 76 KB 9. Heroism and Horror 9.1 Preparedness as of September 11 9.2 September 11, 2001 9.3 Emergency Response at the Pentagon 9.4 Analysis PDF, 2.3 MB HTML, 130 KB 10. Wartime 10.1 Immediate Responses at Home 10.2 Planning for War 10.3 "Phase Two" and the Question of Iraq PDF, 109 KB HTML, 45 KB 11. Foresight--and Hindsight 11.1 Imagination 11.2 Policy 11.3 Capabilities 11.4 Management PDF, 133 KB HTML, 67 KB 12. What To Do? A Global Strategy 12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge 12.2 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations 12.3 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism 12.4 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks PDF, 184 KB HTML, 110 KB 13. How To Do It? A Different Way of Organizing the Government 13.1 Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide 13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community 13.3 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information 13.4 Unity of Effort in the Congress 13.5 Organizing America's Defenses in the United States PDF, 158 KB HTML, 79 KB Appendices PDF, 109 KB HTML, 49 KB Notes PDF, 669 KB HTML, 681 KB PDF files can be viewed using the free Adobe Reader software.